DETROIT V. BLA EBY.

.cautious in so doing. Unless the case is entire y-Ncle T'eir
interference would be usurpation.
In the present cage there can be no questionlha t the legis.
lature decided wisely and well. This railroad-will iuic ues.
tionably develop lands now comparatively valueless;,and'add
millions to the taxable capital of the State. A legislat d can
hardly go amiss on this point.
If, indeed, private corporations are to become unduly rich
by running these roads; if the success of such companies in
that business is so assured as that all risk of loss is gone; then
it may be the duty of the State to limit their.profits or otherwise curtail the privileges granted. But this is a matter for
the legislature, not the courts. Unwise legislation is on,
thing, unconstitutional legislation is another.
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CITY OF DETROIT V. BLAKEBY AN-D WIFE.
A mumclpal corporation is not liable, in a private action for damages, for In.
juries caused by neglect to keep its streets in repair.
The cases founded on mere neglect to repair, and on acts of positive misfea.
sauce, reviewed and distinguished by CAxram,
C. J.

THIs was an action by defendants in error, against the city
of Detroit, for damages received from the defective condition
of a cross-walk. In the Wayne Circuit Court the defendants
in error had a verdict and judgment, to which the city took
this writ of error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AmPBELL, C. J. The principal question in this case is
whether the city of Detroit is liable to a private action of an
injured party for neglect to keep a cross-walk in repair. The
other questions involve an inquiry into the circumstances
which would go tomodify any such liability in the present case,
There has been but one case in this State decided by this
court, where the claim for damages arose purely out of a neglect to repair. In Dewey y.Detroit, 15 Mich. 307, such a suit
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was brought but it did not call for a decision upon the -main
question.

In Township of Niles v. Martin,4 Mich. 557, it was

'held there was no such liability in a tornship, and this case
was followed by us at the present term in Towuship of £foni
v. Taylor. It was held in Larkin v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich.
88, that a county could not be sued for directing a bridge to
be built on a plan that was defective and injurious. In Pennoyer v. Saginaw aty, 8 Mich. 534, a city was held liable for
'continuing a- private nuisance which it had created, and in
Corey v. Detroit, 9 Mich. 165, the city of Detroit was held
liable for an accident caused by leaving an excavation in a
street for a sewer, imperfectly guarded. In Delmont v. Detroit,
4 Mich. 135, it was held the city was not liable for the flooding of a cellar by a sewer, into which it drained. None of those
cases presented the precise question raised here, and we are
required therefore to consider it as an original inquiry, except
in so far as it may be affected by any principles involved in
the cases already decided.
The streets of Detroit are public highways, designed like all
other roads for the benefit of all people desiring to travel upon
them. The duty or power of keeping them in proper condition
is a public and not a private duty, and it is an office for the
performance of which there is no compensation given to the
city. Whatever liability exists to perform this service to the
public, and to respond for any failure to perform it, must
arise, if at all, from the implication that is claimed to exist
in the nature of such a municipality.
There is a vague impression that municipalities are bound in
all cases to answer in damages for all private injuries from defects in the public ways. But the law in this State and in most
parts of the country rejects this as a general proposition, and
confines-the recovery to cases of grievances arising under
peculiar qircumstances. If there is any ground for recovery
here, it is because Detroit is incorporated, and it depends there
fore on the consideration whetherthere is anything in the nature
of incorporated municipalities like this which should subject
them to liabilities not enforced against towns and counttes.
-
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The cases which recognize the distinction apply it to villages
and cities alike.
It has never been claimed that the violation of duty to the
public was any more reprehensible in these corporations than
outside of them; nor that there was any more justice in giving
damages for an injury sustained in a city or village street, than
for one sustained outside of the corporate bounds. The private
suffering is the same and the official negligence may be the
same. The reason, if it exists, is to be found in some other
direction, and can only be tried by a comparison of some of the
classes of authorities which ha ve dealt with the.subject in hand.
It has been held that corporations may be liable to suit for
positive mischief produced by their active misconduct, and not
by mere errors ofjudgm3at, and while the application of this
rule may have been of doubtful correctness in some cases, the
ruleitself is at least intelligible and will cover many decisions.
It was substantially upon this principle that the case of Detroit
v. Corey was rested by the judges who concurred in the con.-iusion. Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, was a case of this
kind, involving a direct encroachment on private property.
Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 3 N. Y. 465,

where a natural water-course was narrowed and obstructed by
a culvert entirely unfit for its purpose and not planned by a
competent engineer, is put upon this ground in the decision of
'icoxv. Plattsburg, cited 16 N. Y. 161; Lee v. Village of
Sandy Hill,40 N. Y. 422, involved a direct trespass.
The injuries involved in these New York and Massachusetts
cases referred to, were not the result of public nuisances, but
were purely private grievances. And in several cases cited on
the argument the mischiefs complained of were altogether private. The distinction between these and public nuisances or
neglects has not always been observed, and has led to some of
the confusion which is found in the authorities. In all the
cases involvinginj uries from obstructions to drainage, the grievance was a private nuisance. In case of Mayor v. Furge, 3
Hill 612, which has been generally treated as a leading case,
the damage was caused by water backing up from sewers not
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kept cleaned out as they should have been: Barton v. Syracuse,
36 N. Y. 54, involved similar questions as did also Childs v.
Boston, 4 Allen 41. These cases do not harmonize with Dermont v. Detroit,4 Mich. 135; but they rest on the assumption
that having constructed the sewers voluntarily for private purposes, and not as a public duty, the obligation was complete to
keep them from doing any mischief, as it would be in private
persons. And in Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill 538; S. 0. 2 Denio
433, the mischief was caused by the breaking away of a dam
connected with the Croton water works, whereby the property
of theplaintiff was destroyed. In this latter case the judgment
rested entirely upon the theory that the city held the water
works as a private franchise and possession, and subject to all
the responsibilities of private ownership. The judges, who re:
garded it as a public work, held there was no liability. In
Conard v. 1rustees of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 159, the facts were
substantially like those in Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, and the decision was rested on the principles of that case
DFNio, 0. J., who delivered the opinion of the court, stated his
own opinion to be that there was no liability, but that he
regarded the recent decision in another case referred to as
establishing it, and in Liverpool v. Freeholdersof Camden, 29
N. J. 245 (and on Error, 2 Vroom. 507), under a statute like
that which was considered by this court in Township of Leoni
v. Taylor, it was decided that while a passenger over a bridge
could sue for injuries, yet where property adjacent was injured
by the bridge, there was no remedy. Upon anything which
sustains the liability for such grievances, however, it is manifest that the injury is not a public grievance in any sense, and
does not involve a special private damage, from an act that
t the same time effects injuriously the whole people.
Another class of injuries involves a public grievance specially
injuring anindividual,arising out of some neglect or misconduct
in the management of some of those works which are held in
N. Y., to concern the municipality in its private interests, and
to be in the law the same as private enterprises. It is held,
that in constructing sewers aid similiar works, which can only
be built by city direction, if the streets are broken up and injn43
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ries happen because no adequate precautions are taken, the liability shall be enforced as springing from that carelessness, and
not on the ground of non-repairs of highways. Lloyd v. Mayor,
5 N. Y. 369, and Stors v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104, were cases of
this kind. In these cases, as in the case of Detroit v. Corey,
thestreetswere heldtohave been broken up by direct agency
of the city authorities, and the negligence which caused the
injury was held to be negligence in doing a work requiring
special care, or in other words, the wrong complained of was
a misfeasance and not a mere omission. The case of Weet v.
Broccport, 16 N. Y. 161, was also a case wherSELDEN, J., who
reviewed and discussed all the decisions, said it was not necessary to consider the wrong complained of as a mere neglect
of duty, because it was in itself a dangerous public nuisance,
created by the corporation, and not in any sense non-feasance.
In Delmonico v. Mayor, 1 Sandf. 226, the injuries, though in
a highway, consisted in crushing in a vault under the street,
by improperly piling earth upon it while excavating for a
sewer, and there was also a direct misfeasance.
The cases in which cities and villages have been held subject
to suits for neglect of public duty, in not keeping highways in
repair, where none of the other elements have been taken into
the account, are not numerous,and all which quote any authority profess to rest especially upon the New York cases, except
where the remedy is statutory. It will be proper therefore to
notice what those cases are, and upon what cases they are supported. The only cases of this kind decided in the courts of
last resort, that we have been able to find, are Hutson v. Mayor,
9 N. Y. 163; HRikox v. Plattsburg,16 N. Y. 161, and Davenport v. Ruc7cman, 37 N. Y. 568. * This latter case resembles
the one before us very closely in its leading features, and would
furnish a very close precedent. It is not reasoned out at all,
but refers for the doctrine to the other two cases, and to an
authority in 18 N. Y., which does not relate to municipal liabilities. The case of Hutson v. Mayor, does not attempt to find
any distinct foundation for the right of action, but refers to the
oases in 3 Hill, and Rochester White Lead Co. v. ochester, and
"Adsitv: Brady, 4 Hill 630, as having established the liability.
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This latter case is disapproved in Weet v. Brockport, and the
others are sustained there on the ground of misfeasance, and as
Judge DENIo, when the decisions in 16 New York were made,
stated that he had not supposed there was anycorporate liability for mere neglect to keep ways in repair, it is quite possible
that the case of Hwuston v. Mayor was regarded as distinguishable. The circumstances were very aggravated, as it would
seem that the city had left a road too narrow to accommodate
a carriage, without any paving and without protection against
the danger of falling down a deep embankment into a railroad
excavation. The report is not as full as could be desired upon
the precise state of facts. In the Supreme Court, where the
judges differ in opinion (two dissenting), the liability seems,
from the view taken of that case by Judge SELDBN, to' have
rested on the ground that there had been a breach of private
duty and not of duty to the public. If this was the view actually taken, it would not bring the case within the same category
with the other road cases. But the case of Weetv. Brockport,
16 New York 161, is recognized as the one in which the whole
law has been finally settled, and it is upon the grounds there
laid down that the liability is now fixed in New York. The
elaborate opinion of Judge SELDEN, which was adopted by the
Court of Appeals, denies the correctness of the dicta in some
of the previous cases, and asserts the liability to an action solely
upon the ground that the franchises granted to municipal corporations are in law a sufficient consideration for an implied
promise to perform with fidelity all the duties imposed by the
charter, and that the liability is the same as that which
attaches against individuals who have franchises in ferries,
toll bridges and the like. The principle as he states it is:
"That whenever an individual or a corporation, for a consideration received from the sovereign power, has become
bound by covenant or agreement, either express or implied, to
do certain things, such individual or corporation is liable, in
case of neglect to perform such covenant, not only toa public
prosecution by indictment, but to a private action at the suit
of any person injured by such neglect. In all such cases the
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contract made with the sovereign poweris deemed to enure to
the benefit of every individual interested in its performance."
In order to get at the true ground of liability, the opinion
goes on to determine, first, whether townships and other public
bodies, not being incorporated cities or villages, are liable, and
shows conclusively that they are not, and the court arrives at
this conclusion not on the basis of an absence of duty or an
absence of means, but because their duties are duties to the
public and not to individuals. Full citations are made from
the English cases which were cited before us, and also from the
American cases. The case of Young v. Commissionerof Roads,

2 NA.& MoO. 537,is cited approvingly,and the following language
is quoted as expressing the correct idea: "When an officer has
been appointed to act, not for the public in general, but for
individuals in particular, and from each individual receives an
equivalent for the services rendered him, he may be responsible
in a private action for a neglect of duty, but when the officer
acts for the public in general, the appropriate remedy for his
neglect of duty is a public prosecution." In another part of
the ofiinion, sheriffs are given as examples of the former and
highway commissioners of the latter class of officers. The
cases cited do not all require the consideration for the services
to come immediately from individuals, but they all require the
services to be due to individuals and not to the public, and to
spring from contract. The English cases are reviewed in the
Hersey Dock Cases, 1 H. of L. Oases N. S. 93 ; 1 H. & N. 493 ;
3 Id. 161, and exemplify this. Thus the liability to repair a
sea-wallis infavor of those who own the property adjacent; the
liability to keep docks safe of access in favor of those who have
occasion to require their use upon the customary terms; the
liability to keep toll-bridges safe in favor of those who use them.
But there is no instance of liability where the public is interested directly, and in those cases where the obligation rests
upon the consideration of corporate franchises, the duty has
always been toward individuals, although the consideration
moved from the State. The decisions upon this sustain the
views of Judge SELDEN concerning his premises, but there is
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some difficulty in reaching his conclusion through them. It is
admitted everywhere, except in a single case in Maryland, that
there is no common law liability against ordinary municipal corporations, such as towns or counties, and that they cannot be
sued except by statute. It has also been uniformly held in New
York as well as elsewhere, that public officers whose offices are
created by act of the legislature, are in no sense municipal agents,
and that their neglect is not to be regarded as the neglect of
the municipality, and their misconduct is not chargeable against
it unless it is authorized or ratified expressly or by implication.
This doctrine has been applied to cities as well as to all other
corporations. Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570; White v.
Philiston,10 Metc. 108; Afower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247;
Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541; Wolcott v. BSwanscott, 1
Allen 101 ; Young v. Com'r of Roads, 2 Nott & McOord 537;
Pack v. Mayor, 4 Seld. 222; Martin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 1
Bill 545; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 J. R. 438; Morey v. Newfane,
8 Barb. 605; Eastman v. Aeredith, 36 N. Y. 284; Hyde v.
Tamaica, 27 Vt. 443; Lorillardv. Town of Monroe, 11 N Y
392; Mitchell v. Rockland, 52 Maine, 168-and the numerous
cases which exonerate cities from liabilities for not enforcing
their police laws so as to prevent damage, rest upon a very
similar basis-Howell v. Alexandria, 3 Peters 398; Levy v.
Mayor, Sandf. S. C. 465; Proctorv. Lexington, 13 B. Monroe
509; Howe v. lzrew Orleans, 12-La. Ann. 481; Western Reserve
College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; Brinkmeyer v. .Evans-

ville, 29 Ind. 187; Griffin v. Mayor, 9 N. Y. 456. In the case
of Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, the distinction between
the English and American municipal corporations is clearly
defined. The former often hold special property and franchises
of a profitable nature, which they have received upon conditions, and which they can hold by the same indefeasible right
with individuals. But American municipalities hold their
functions merely as governing agencies. They may own private
property and transact business not strictly municipal, if allowed
by law to do so, just as private parties may, and with the same
liability; but their public funictions are all held at sufferance,
aad their duties may be multiplied and enforced at the pleasure
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of the legislature. They have no choice in the matter; they
have no -privileges which cannot be taken away, and they derive no profit from their care of the public ways, and the execution of their public functions. They differ from towns only in
the extent of their powers and duties bestowed for public purposes, and their improvements are made by taxation, just as
they are made on a smaller scale in towns and counties. In
the case of Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill 538, it was intimated by
Judge NELSON that the State could not compel the city to
accept its chartr, and in Child v. Boston, 4 Allen 41, the fact
that the sewerage system had been left to vote and been accepted, was held to make it a private and not a public matter.
The sewer cases have, in several instances, gone upon this latter
notion. It is not necessary to discuss that question here, because streets are not private and because in this State at least
no municipality can exercise any powers except by State permission, and every municipal charter is liable to be amended at
pleasure. The charter of Detroit has undergone most radical
thanges. It is impossible to sustain the proposition that those
charters rest on contract, and it is impossible, as Judge SELDEN
demonstrates, to find any legal warrant for any other ground
for distinguishing the liability of one municipal body from that
of another. There is no basis or authority for any such distinction concerning the consideration on which their powers are
granted, and it rests upon simple assertion; and yet the decision stands in New York as authority for all that is claimed
here because, although in the case in which the opinion was
given in the Supreme Court, it-was not called for, yet in the
case of Hickox v. Trustees of Plattsburg,16 N. Y. 161, in which

it was adopted as the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the mischief was a mere neglect of repair, when the street had been
obstructed by an individual excavation for a short time.
It is impossible to harmonize the decision with the previous
decisions exempting corporations from responsibility, because
public offcers were not their agents. It is no easier to sustain
it in the face of the uniform decisions denying liability for failure to enforce their police regulations. The authorities which
make corporatigns liable on the ground of conditions attached to
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their franchises, go very far toward compelling themeto respond
as absolutely bound to prevent mischief, and the general reasoning on which most of the opinions rest, and the criticisms
made upon former decisions-which it is asserted went altogether too far in creating liability-allare designed to show, and
do show very forcibly, that simply as municipal corporations,
apart from any contract theory, no public bodies can be made
responsible for official neglect involving no active misfeasance.
There is no such distinction recognized in the law elsewhere.
In City of Providence v. Clapp, 17 Howard 161, the United

States Supreme Court, through Judge NELSON, held that cities
and towns were alike in their responsibility and in their immunity.

In County officers of Anne Arundel v. Duckett, 20 Md.

468, a county was held responsible to the fullest extent. In
New Jersey in Freeholders of Sussex v. Strader, 3 Harrison
108; County Freekoldersof Essex, 27 N. J. 415; Livermore v.
Freeholdersof Camden, 29 N. J. 245, and 2 Vroom 507, and
Pray v. Mayor of Jersey City, 32 N. J. 394, the cases were all

rested on the same principles,and cities were exonerated because
towns and counties were. The suggestion of Judge SELDE'N
has been caught at by some courts since the decision, and has
been carried to its legitimate results, as in Jones v. Nrew Raven
34 Con. 1, where the damage was caused by a falling limb of
a tree. But so far as we have seen, even the cases which are
decided on this ground do not hold that towns do not receive
their powers upon a consideration as well as cities. That
question still remains to be handled in those courts.
It is utterly impossible to draw any rational distinction on any
6uch grounds. It is competent for the legislature to give towns
and counties powers as large as those granted to cities. Each
receives what is supposed to be necessary or convenient, and
eacn receives this, because the good government of the people
is supposed to require it. It would be contrary to every princi.
ple of fairness to give special privileges to any part of the people
and deny them to others, and such is not the purpose of city
charters. In England the burgess of boroughs and cities have
very important and valuable privileges of an exclusive nature
and not common to all the people of the realm. Their char-
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ters are grants of privilege and not mere government agencies
Their free customs and liberties were put by the great charter
under the same immunity with private freeholds. But in this
State and in this country generally they are not placed beyond
legislative control. The Dartmouth College case, which first
established charters as contracts, distinguished between public
and private corporations, and there is no respectable authority
to be found anywhere which holds that either offices or municipalctlarters generallyinvolve any rights of property whatever.
They are all created for public uses and subject to public control.
We think that it will require legislative action to create
any liability to private suit for non-repairs of public ways.
Whether such responsibility should be created, and to what
extent and under what circumstances it should be enforced,
are legislative questions of importance and some nicety. They
cannot be solved by courts.
Judgment reversed.
COOLEY, J., dissented.
The foregoing case is one that cannot fail to be of interest to the profession, inasmuch as it concerns an
important question affecting a great
number of our municipalities to a very
large extent, and is, at the same time,
a departure from the doctrines, which
have bpen supposed to have been
adopted by the English courts and
those of some of the American States.
The question is by no means free
from difficulty; and we cannot fairly
say that we have been able to devote
sufficient time to an examination and
analysis of the cases bearing upon the
point, to enable us to speak confidently

Davenporl v. .ucknman, 37 M. Y. 568,
the rule is thus stated: When the
streets or sidewalks of the city of New
York are out of repair through the
neglect of the corporation, it is liable
to an action for such neglect, at the

suit of the person injured, whether
the injury arises from some act done
by the corporation, or from an omission of duty of their part. And the
same doctrine is found in numerous
earlier decisions in that State, most ox
which are referred to in the opinion
in the case under review. The rule
is thus stated is a late case in the
Supreme Court of New Tork: "Whatof the exactweight ofauthority against ever may be the case in regard to
the decision here made. There seems commissioners of highways in towns,
to be no question whatever, that the a different and more stringent rule
New York courts have adopted a rule appears to have been applied to cor
npon the subject more in conformity porations and the trustees of a vil
l
with the dissenting opinion in this case lage"': Hiyau v. The Truteev of th,
than with that of the majority.

In

lage of Rondout, 44 Barb. 38D.
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And in Wendell v. 2%e iy of Troy,
Keyes, W. Y. Court of Appeals261
the city was held responsible for an
Injury to the plaintiff by means of
the defective construction of a drain

under the street, whereby it caved
in, although built by a private person
for his own convenience by permislion of the city authorities. The New
York cases seemto go the fuUlength of
making cities and-villages responsible
for all damage caused by any failure
to perform the duties imposed by their
charters, on the ground that having
sought special acts of incorporation
they arebound, as corporations, to the
performance of all the duties imposed
by such charters, as conditions voluntarily assumed by the corporations,
impliedly at least, by reason of the
acceptance of the charters containing
such conditions. And the case of.Tones
v. The City of fNew Haven, 34 Conn.
1, seems to go much upon the same
ground, except that there the matter
came specially under one of their own
by-laws, in regard to which there
might seem to be less question than
if the duty had been imposed by the
legislature as a public duty or burden.
The general doctrine that a public
officer is not responsible for the misconduct of his subordinates, although
iis appointees, has been recognized
from an early day: Lane v. CotIon, 1
Ld. Day 646, where the action was
against the postmaster general for
the default of his deputies. The case
of the Mayor of Lyyme Regis v. Henley, 3 B. & Ad. 77; S. C 2 Cl. &
Fin. 331,was an action for injury to
the defendant's land by reason of the
plaintiffs falling to repair certain sea
walls appertaining to their mumcipality, and which the condition of
their charter cbliged them to main-

tain and keep in repair. The case
was first decided by the Common
Pleas, in favor of the present defen.
dant, 5 Bing. 9, and came for hearIng on writ of error in the King's
Bench. LoRD TZNTERD N, Ch, J., gave
judgment for the defendant, upon
the ground that the corporation by
accepting its charter became bound to
perform all its conditions,andwhoever
suffered damage through any default
in that respect may have an action
and the public may have redress for
such defaults by indictment.
The subject has been more or less
considered by the English courts since
that time; but the case of the Merse,
Docks v. Gibbs, and the same v. Pen
hallow, 'I L Lds. Cases, N. S., 93128; S. C., 1 H. & N. 439; 3 id. 164,
seems to have put the question at
rest there, so far as thepoints involved
in the latter case are concerned. The
injury complained of here occurred
by reason of the docks being out of
repair. The plaintiffs are a public
corporation, created for the purpose
of maintaining the harbor of Liver.
pool, and are required to maintain
and keep in repair suitable docks and
other harbor accommodations, for the
use of which they are authorized to
demand certain dues, which are intended to maintain the works, and
are to be lessened whenever they produce more than is required for that
purpose. The Court of Exchequer
gave judgment in favor of the corpo.
ration, on the authority of Mec'akJe v.
Hetherington, 11 Exch. 258; but this
judgment was reversed in the Ex.
chequer Chamber; 3 H. & N. 164,
and the judgment of the Vxchequer
Chamber affirmed in the House of
Lords. The case of Gibbs was heard
on demurrer to the declaration which
contained the averment that the con.
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pany knowing that the dock and its
entranee was, by reason of accumaulatic0 of mud, unfit to be used by
ships, did not take due and, reasonable or any care to put it In a fit
state, but negligently suffered the
dock to remain in such unfit state,
whilst, as they well knew, it was
used by vessels, and that the damages
arose in consequence.
The case in the Exchequer Chamber
seems to have been decided upon the
general ground thkt a corporation
created for the purpose of maintainIng public works, and receiving tolls
or dues for the use of the same, is
bound to see that such works are kept
In a safe and fit condition for public
pae. This decision 'went upon the
authority of 2t Lancaster Canac Lb.
v. Parnacb, 1 Ad. & EL 223, 242.
And it was here considered that it
made no difference whether the tolls
were reserved for the benefit of the
ahareholders, as in the last case cited,
orinafduciarycapacity, asin thepre.

walks being' out of repair than are
towns or counties, upon whom the
duty of keeping highways in repair
is imposed, where it has long been
settled there is no responsibility for
injuries occurring by want of repairs,
unless Imposed by statute. But the
earlier English cases held a more
stringent rule of responsibility in regard to cities and villages having
special acts of incorporation, and
chiefly upon the ground that they had
accepted them voluntarily, and thus
assumed the duties imposed by the
charters thus accepted. How far this
distinction is well-founded it will not
be altogether decisive of the question
to inquire. For since it has been
long settled that such corporations
are so responsible, it might not be
entirely just to the public to now
declare their irresponsibility, when,
but for the rule of responsibility
already established, the legislature
might have provided for such respon.
sibility by special enactments, as in
sent case. And the house of Lords the case of towns. For while it, may
seem to have decided the case upon be reasoned with great plausibility
this view. Lord CnAxwoaTn, chancel- that there is no good reason, aside
lor, said the destruction was one that from the former decisions, to hold
could be held to affect the rights of cities and villages to any higher dethose using the docks. Lord Wesrzr- gree of responsibility in regard to
Dsrz said, if the question were res damages occurring by reason of their
jntera, and not settled by authority, highways being out of repair, than
he would be inclined to hold that it towns are held, it may at the same
came within the principle of the cases time be urged with great propriety
where public officers have been held that they should be held to the same
not liable to a private action for neg- responsibility. Butunderthe decision
lect of duty by servants appointed by here made they could not be so held
them. But upon the former decisions in most of the States. Since the legishe held the judgment below must be latures have omitted in most cases, It
affirmed. And Lord WxsTauny fully is fair to presume, to Impose the same
concarred with the Lord Chancellor.
duty by statutes upon cities and vil.
Andit seems to usthat this case isin lages, which they do upon towns, on
itself no suffilent authority for hold- the ground that it is not required by
ing cities and villages any more re- reason of the general principles of the
sponsiblp for their streets and side- law having already imposed that duty
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apon them,this considerationwilltend
to show that the restoration of the
law to symmetry in this particular
will morb conveniently come from the
legislature than from the courts. Beyond this it does not occur to us that
auy very convincing argument can
fairly be urged against the decision of
the court in this case. It cannot, we
think, as a general rule, be justly held
that towns are any less responsible
for the consequences of leaving the
highway in an unsafe condition than
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cities and villages are. If it requires
a special statutory enactment to impose any such responsibility upon
towns, we do not, upon general prin.
ciples, very well comprehend why It
should not require the same in the
case of cities and villages. Our only
doubt would be whether the sym.
metry of the law upon this point
might not better be restored by the
legislature.
L F. R.

Court of Errors and Appeals pfMis&4ssitpp .
PATRICK DEEVER V. THE STEAMER HOPE.
State legislatures have no authority to create maritime liens or confer jurisdiction on the State courts to enforce such liens by proceedings in rern. Such
jurisdiction Is exclusively in the Courts of Admiralty of the United States.
Suit was brought against a vessel by name, and the vessel attached under
the water craft laws of Mississippi, for a debt due plaintiff. Plaintiff made
affidavit that defendant was a steamerin the navigable waters of the State
and in his declaration set forth that he was a citizen of Mississippi, and that
the "home port" of the vessel was in that State: Held, that the court had no
jurisdiction, the cause being one of admiralty.

THIS was an attachment issued by the plaintiff against the
defendant, under the provisions of the act, entitled " An Act
to provide a remedy by attachment against ships, steamboats,
and other water crafts," chapter 53 of rev. code, p. 383.
Plaintiff made the affidavit required by article 2 of said ac,
in which he stated that "the steamboat Hope, a steamer in
the navigable waters of this State" was indebted to him in the
sum of $399.15, and also executed the requisite bond under
the provisions of article 2, and the attachment was sued out,
and made returnable to the Circuit Court ofYazoo county; the
sheriff *attached certain furniture and other chattels, in and
belonging to the boat, which were replevied by Thomas Metzler, the captain of the steamer, under article 3 of the act.
At the return term, the plaintiff filed his declaratioii.on the
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account stated to be due him by the boat, stating that he was
a citizen of the State of Mississippi, and that "home port of
the said defendant (the steamer Hope) is in this State," and
that the owners of said boat reside in Mississippi; and further
alleged, that the cause for action was for work and labor performed by plaintiff upon said boat in repairing the same.
The defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court,alleging
that the defendant was a vessel navigating the Yazoo and Mississippi rivers, which are navigable from the sea by vessels of
ten tons burden; and that the demand of the plaintiff, if any, is
cognizable in the District Court of the United States, which
has exclusive jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, when seizures are made in waters which
are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten tons burden. To
this plea there was a demurrer-which was overruled, and the
plaintiff declining to reply, judgment final was rendered for the
defendant, and this writ of error was taken to that judgment.
The errors assigned were, that the court erred in overruling
the demurrer, and in rendering judgment for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHAOKELFORD, J.-The only question for our consideration
in this case is, whether the Circuit Court of Yazoo county had
'jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. The objection
to the jurisdiction is that the case as developed by the pleadings, was one exclusively of admiralty jurisdiction for the District Court of the United States, for the District of Mississippi.
Counsel for the defendant in error in support of this proposition refer us to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the cases of The Moses Taylor, 4 Wal. 411,
and The Hein v. Trevor, Id. 555.
On the other hand, counsel for plaintiff in error cite the
cases of Allen v. K~ewbury, 21 How. 244; and J]HGuirev. Cord,

Id. 248, as conclusive in favor of the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court below, and insists that unless the plea of the defendant
in error contained an allegation that the steamer Hope was
engaged in the inter State trade that the demurrer should have
been sustained.
The affidavit of plaintiff in error asking for the attachment
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issued in the case under consideration only contained an allegation that the steamer Hope was indebted to him in the sum
of $339.15, and that the vessel "was in the navigable waters
of the State of Mississippi."
The authority for the proceedings in this case is article 1 of
the "Water Craft" law above referred to, which provides,
that "when any person shall have any cause of action against
the owner, captain, master, supercargo, or other person in
charge of any ship, brig, sloop, steamboat, etc., in any navigable waters of the State, or navigating the rivers or seas in
or adjacent to this State, for or on account of any such water
craft, or the business in which said craft may be employed, it
shall be lawful to prosecute the same against such water craft
by the name thereof, or by such description as will enable
the officer executing the writ to identify the same."
This statute gives the remedy to a creditor, whether the
boat is engaged in trade exclusively between ports in the
same State, or ports in different States.
The plaintiff in his declaration alleges that the home port of
the steamer Hope is in the State of Mississippi; this allegation
is equivalent to an allegation that the owners reside in the State,
and nothing more, although counsel seems to consider it as
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, as the allegation was
intended to show that the steamer was engaged exclusively
in domestic trade, or trade and navigation between ports in
the State and on waters entirely within the State.
This is an inference which we think cannot be legitimately
drawn from the facts set forth in the affidavit and declaration
of plaintiff in error.
If the jurisdiction of the court depended upon the fact that
the steamer was engaged exclusively in trade within and upon
the waters of the State, this the affidavit of plaintiff in error
should have shown. Because the Yazoo river is a navigable
stream entirely within the State, it does not follow that she
was engaged in trade and navigation upon said river, or that
the terminus of her trips were ports in this State.

It is evident from the affidavit of plaintiff in error that he
relied upon t~e provisions of article 1 of the statute above
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referred to, for the legality of his proceedings, without reference to the trade she was engaged in.
Unless the jurisdiction of the court can be sustained under
the affidavit of plaintiff in error and the provisions of art. 1
of the act in question, the allegation in the declaration, that
the "home port" of the defendant in error is in this State,
could not strengthen his case or give the court jurisdiction, if
it had been at the commencement of his suit. We are therefore to consider the question of jurisdiction solely upon the
allegation in the affidavit of plaintiff in error in connection
with the provisions of article 1 of the statute above quoted.
-In the case of Allen v. Newbury, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a contract of affreightment between
ports and places within the same State, was not the subject of
admiralty jurisdiction, as it concerned purely the internal
State trade, and that the jurisdiction belonged to the courts
of the State. This doctrine was affirmed at the same term of
the court in the case McGuire v. Cord
The doctrine announced in these cases cannot be applied to
the case under consideration. If it were true that the defendant in error was engaged exclusively in the domestic trade, or
between ports in this State, the doctrine in these cases has
been overruled in the case of The Belfast, 7 Wallace 624.
In the opinion delivered by Justice CLIFFORD in that case,
the case of Allen v. Newbury is reviewed. He says: "Remarks,
it is conceded, are found in the opinion of the court in the
case of Allen v. Newbury, inconsistent with these views, but
they were not necessary to that decision, as the contract in
that case was for the transportation of goods on one of the
Western Lakes, when the jurisdiction in admiralty is restricted
by an act of Congress to steamboats and other vessels employed
in the business of commerce and navigation between ports
and places in different States and Territories," referring to
The Hein v. Trevor, 4 Wallace 555.
In the case of The Belfast,the owner of the Belfast excepted
to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the State of Alabama,
and alleged that the steamer, at the time the cotton was shipped,
was duly enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United
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States; that she was then and there engaged in commerce and
navigation between the city of Columbus, in the State of Mississippi, and the city of Mobile, in the State of Alabama, and
that the cotton described in the libel was lost on her trip from
the former city to the point of destination.
The cotton was shipped from a port in the State of Alabama to the city of Mobile, in one of the shipments mentioned
in the libel, but all the cases were to be decided together.
The counsel for the libelants contended that, inasmuch as the
cotton was shipped in one of the cases from ports in the same
State, the State court had jurisdiction of that case, impliedly
admitting the jurisdiction of the court would not attach, if the
cotton had been shipped from a port in a different State, to
the city of Mobile.
The court, after an elaborate review of most of the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, involving .questions
of jurisdiction in case of admiralty, held that the State court
in Alabama had no jurisdiction of those cases, including the
one where the cotton was shipped in Alabama, and that the
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty *
and maritime jurisdiction is, by the terms of the ninth section
of the judiqiary act of 1789, conferred upon the District Courts
of the United States, saving to the suitors in all cases, the
right of a common law remedy, when the common law is
competent to give it. Nothing is said about concurrent jurisdiction in a State court, or any other court.
Counsel for plaintiff in error insists that the plea of defendant
in error does not contain the necessary allegations to oust the
It was incumbent upon the
Circuit Court ot jurisdiction.
the
proceedings in his cause that
by
show
to
plaintiff in error
the court had jurisdiction. If the court had no cognizance of
the subject-matter of the action, and it was one for the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States,
it was not necessary for the defendant in error to file a plea
to the jurisdiction, or any other plea, showing reasons why
the case should be dismissed. That could have been done ox
motion of counsel, or even upon the motion of the court e3
offico: 8 Mass. Rep. 87; 12 Id. 367, and cases cited.
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Another view taken of this point by counsel for plaintiff in
error is, that "material men, furnishers of supplies, repairs,
etc, have no maritime lien on a vessel so supplied in her home
port; and further, that a vessel engaged exclusively in the
domestic commerce of a State, although plying in public navigable waters, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States, and contracts made with her. or her, owners or
officers, are not maritime contracts."
The first branch of this proposition is correct, but material
men who furnish materials or supplies for a vessel in a foreign
port, or in a port other than a port of the Statewhere the vessel belongs, have a maritime lien on the vessel as a security for
the payment of the price of all such materials and supplies.
They have such a lien, because upon the principles of the
maritime law, such materials and supplies are presumed to be
furnished, on the credit of the vessel and consequently they
are entitled to proceed in rem, in the Admiralty Court to enforce the lien: The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 437; TheBel.
fast, 7 Wallace, 624.
The second branch of the proposition of counsel, we have
already shown to be untenable.
The record does not disclose, that the cause of action, the
subject-matter of the attachment, was or was not created or
contracted with the owners of the defendant in error at the
alleged "home port." of the vessel. There is nothing to show
where the indebtedness accrued.
The home port of the defendant in error, at the time of the
creation of the indebtedness sued on, might have been in any
other State, nothing in the record appearing to the contrary.
The allegation of the plaintiff in error, in his declaration
relative to the "home port" of the defendant in error, only
applied to the status of the parties at the time of filing the
declaration. The record does not disclose an. fact tending to
establish the presumption raised by counsel, that the contract
for labor and materials furnished was performed or executed
at the "home port" of the defendant in error where she was
attached.
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Shipwrights who have taken a vessel into their possession
to repair, if a domestic one, or have worked upon it without
retaining it in their possession as a security for their claims
and let it pass out out of their possession, have no claim or
lien upon the ship unless given by statute: The General Smith4,
4 Wheat. 438.
There being no statute in this State creating a sipecdfic lien
upon vessels for labor performed or materials furnished by
shipwrights or material men at the "home port" of vessels,
if they permit them to pass out of their possession without
getting their pay, they have to resort to their common law
remedy.
The plaintiff should have pursued his common law remedy
against the owners of the steamer, if he had performed the
labor and furnished materials for the boat at her "home port"
in this State; the owners of defendant being residents of the
State at the time the plaintiff sued out his attachment.
State legislatures have no authority to create a maritime
lien, nor can they confer any jurisdiction upon a court to enforce such lien, by suit or proceeding in rem as practiced in
the Admiralty Courts of the United States.
The jurisdiction conferred by the act of 1789, on the District Courts of the United States in civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, is exclusive by express terms, and
this exclusion extends to State courts: The foses Taylor, 4
Wallace 411; Hein v. Trevor, 4 Wallace 555; The Belfast, 7
Wallace 624.
The subject-matter of the controvery in the case before us,
being within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction-of the
District Courts of the United States, it necessarily follows,
that the court below has no jurisdiction of the case as prosecuted by plaintiff, the proceedings being purely in rem, and
in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in admiralty.
For these reasons, we think the court did not err in overruling the demurrer, and the judgment is affirmed.

WESTERMAN V. WESTERMAN.

Suiperior Court of Montgomery County, Ohio.
HENRY WESTERMAN V. ELIZABETH WESTERMAN, et at.
The statutes of Ohio, in relation to the property of married women, have in
effect put such property, during coverture, in the position of property limited
by a deed of trust to the sole and separate use of the wife, and where there 2s
no express trust, the husband will be treated as a trustee.
The husband's curtesy Is not entirely and in all cases dsstroyed, bu exists
as an estate contingent upon circumstances prescribed by the statutes.
Therefore, the common law rule that a secret conveyance of her realty by a
woman under contemplation of marriage, s fraudulent and void against the
husband, is not entirely destroyed by the statutes.
A woman just before marriage conveyed land to her children by a former
marriage. The laud was not fully paid for by her at the time of the conveyance, and her grantor subsequently obtained judgment against her and her
husband for the balance of the purchase-money, which the husband was compelled to pay. Held, 1. That the husband having paid the judgment out of
his own money, was entitled to be subrogated to the vendor's lien against the
land, and could enforce the repayment of his money by sale of the land. 2.
That the conveyance to the children was fraudulent as to the husband, and
must be set aside.

Tins was a petition in equity by complainant, Henry Westerman against his wife, Elizabeth, and John and Joseph O'Neil.
The petition charged, that before the marriage of Henry
Westerman to Elizabeth O'iNeil]which took place September 16,
1867, Elizabeth had purchased a tract of land of one Roop, and
was indebted to him thereof at the time of marriage in the
sum of $540; that pending the treaty of marriage, and while
in contemplation of marriage with Henry, without his knowledge, and for the purpose of defrauding him. she conveyed said
land without valuable consideration to her children by a former
marriage, John and Joseph O'Neil, and that Henry remained
ignorant of this conveyance until after the marriage; that after the marriage Roop sued and obtained judgment against
Henry and Elizabeth, his wife, on said indebtedness, and
caused an execution to issue and be levied on the property of
Henry Westerman, and that to save his property from sale on
execution, Henry paid thejudgment. The petition also averred
that Elizabeth had, ever since the marriage, been the owner in
her own separate right, pf other real and personal property
*nd choses in action. Petitioner prayed that the conveyance
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to John and Joseph O'Niel might be set aside as fraudulen%
and that said real estate so conveyed might be sold to pay
said debt.
The defendant, Elizabeth Westerman, demurred to the petition.

C. L. lallandighamfor plaintiff.
Craighead& tunger for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JORDAN, J.-The first question to be considered is, whether
Henry is entitled to have said land sold to pay said debt, and
secondly, whether this conveyance shall be set aside?
In determining this first question, it is necessary to consider
the change our statutes have wrought, in the relation that
husband and wife sustain to each other in regard to property.
By the common law marriage merged the wife in her hus
band, and invested him immediately with all the money and
personal property of which she was possessed, and with the
right to reduce to possession, and become the owner of all her
personal property, and choses in action of which she was not
possessed, and also with usufruct of her real estate during
life, and curtesy after her death, and he became liable for her
debts contracted before marriage.
If, however, the property was limited to the sole and separate use of the wife, by the deed or devise under which sne
held title, and no trustee were appointed, the husband became the trustee of the wife.
The reason assigned by the common law judges why the
wife's property vests in the husband by marriage is because by
marriage she becomes one with him, and loses her personal
identity. And the reason assigned why he becomes liable for
her debts is, because having lost the means of payment by her
property vesting in her husband, she might be imprisoned fo
the debt, and unless the husband was made liable for the debt,
and also liable to imprisonment, he might suffer her to remain
imprisoned,while he held her propety,which,otherwisewould
have served to effect her release, and by making him also relial h., a guaranty of her release was secured. It is not placed on

z
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the princ.pje that he has received her property, for he became
liable whether he acquired property by the marriage or not.
Our statutes have wrought great changes in the maritalrelation. Imprisonment for debt has been abolished, except in
cases of fraud. The statute of 1861 and the amendment there.
of of 1866 exclude the husband from all right to the wife's
property and choses in action, except curtesy, and specifically
provide that the wife's property shall be her sole and separate
property and under her own control and shall be liable for the
payment of her debts contracted before marriage. Yet, notwithstanding, the husband is excluded from all participation in
his wife's property, and she retains it as her separate property,
and her debts before marriage are made a charge upon it, and
she cannot be embarrassed by imprisonment-in fact, although all the reasons that made the husband liable for the
debts of the wife incurred before marriage'have disappeared,
yet the husband remains liable to an action for such debts.
The statute of Pennsylvania, of 1848, which is similar to our
statutes of 1861 and 1866, goes one step further, and exempts
the husband from all liability for such debts of his wife, contracted before marriage,while our statute still leaves him liable.
The effect of this statute is to limit all the wife's property to
her sole and separate use, with all the incidents of property
limited to her sole and separate use by deed or devise before
its passage. Such was held to be the effect of the Pennsylvania Statute of 1848,'in Bear v. Bear, 33 Penn. St. R. 525.
This court has repeatedly so held in requiring actions to
be brought by a married woni-an by hei next friend, under
the section of the code which requires actions concerning her
separate estate to be so brought.
One of the incidents of a separate estate in the wife is a trus'tee to hold the legal title in trust for her, while she retained
the sole control of it: Reeve Dom. Rel. 162; Tyler on In. and
Coy. 431. And where no trustee was appointed, equity would
consider the husband her trustee: Tyler on In. and Cov. 441;
Story on Equity 1380. The necessity for a trustee existed in
the fact that by marrying the wife lost her identity in the husband: Tyler on In. and Coy. 435. And courts of equity
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required him to hold the legal title thus cast upon him in
trust for her.
Now, with these changes in the law, we find Roop holds a
claim against Elizabeth O'Niel for $540, for purchase-money
of a tract of land sold her in 1865. This claim was secured to
him by a vendor's lien. Until this purchase-money was paid
she held the legal title to the land in trust for Roop. With
this indebtedness and this incumbrance on her land, she marries
Henry Westerman in 1867, by which the legal title to all her
real and personal property and choses in action, is vested in
him in trust to hold for her sole and separate use charged with
this debt, and she remains personally liable to a judgment
therefor. By this marriage, Henry Westerman is also made
liable for this debt. The law does not transfer the indebtedness to him, for his liability ceases on the termination of the
marital relation. His executor is not liable. The law simply
makes him collaterally liable-arbitrarily, and for a purpose
and apon a principle that is now without any foundation:
Reeves, Dem. Rel. 68. Under legal compulsion he pays the
debt-uses his money to pay the purchase-money of her land.
Or assuming the legal title to have vested in John and Joseph
O'Niel by voluntary gift from Elizabeth, being grantees without consideration, they take it charged with the vendor's lien,
and with the liability the statute imposes upon her property
to pay her debts, and they hold it in trust for that purpose.
The payment by the husband, under such circumstances,
does not raise a presumption, or rather'repels the presumption
that it was a gift. And to say that the husband shall pay this
debt simply because his marriage made him collaterally liable,
out of his own funds, and thereby rid the land of the incumbrance, pay the purchase-money of the land and have the
title vest in John and Joseph O'Niel, without any redress,
would be inequitable and unjust. I think that standing in the
relation of trustee, holding technically the legal title in trust
for her, and having paid a lien on her land now in the hands
of purchasers without consideration, land .made previously
liable by the statute for the payment of the debt, and having
by this payment used his own rioney to pay for land, the title
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of which vested in others, equity subrogates him to the
rights that Roop had, and charges the land in the hands of
John and Joseph, the present holders of the legal title, for
the paymeni of this debt. And to the extent that the title
in John and Joseph may interfere with the sale of the land
for that purpose the conveyance should be set aside.
It is settled, I think, beyond question, that a conveyance of
her property by the wife before marriage, pending a treaty of
marriage, and in contemplation of marriage, and especially if
done fraudulently as averred in this petition, ought to be set
aside. The husband's curtesy was such an interest as to make
it a fraud upon him to convey it away. The statute of 1869
is relied upon as taking away any interest the husband had
in this property after his wife's death. I think the husband's
curtesy was such a vested interest as to bring it within the
rule in Jenney v. Gray, 5 Ohio State Reports 45; but whether
it does or not, I find the statute deprives the husband of curtesy only on condition that she dies, leaving children 'by a
former marriage. This may never occur. If her children
die before she does, then he has curtesy, and in the light of
this statute he has a contingent curtesy in this land. I have
examined the authorities referred to by counsel, but I find
nothing to interfere with this conclusion. The demurrer is
overruled.

United States Circuit Court, District of Missouri.
MARTIN, ASSSGNEE,

ETC., V. SMITH ET AL.

Unless Congress has otherwise provided, State statutes of limitation are ap.
plied to controversies in the courts of the United States.
The fraud which in equity will prevent the running of the statute oflimita.
tions, is tlt which is secret or concealed, or distinguished from that which is
open, visible or known, and a secret or concealed fraud is in equity a fraiidulent concealment of the cause of action.
Even in cases of fraud, the statute will in equity begin to run as against the
plaintiff when he has knowledge or information of facts which reasonably
areates the belief that the transfer LR fraudulent and can be proved to be so,
and if, under all the circumstances, the plaintiff has been guilty of negligence
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in discovei Ing or attacking the fraud, the statute will begin to operate against
him from the period his laches commenced.
What ln the view of acourt of equity, will be regarded as adsover
of
the fraud considered.
The statute of Missouri, which provides that"actions for relief on the ground
of fraud must be brought within five years after the cause of action accrued,
but the cause of action shall be deemed not to have accrued until the discovcry by the aggrieved party at any time within ten years of the facts constituting the fraud," construed and considered
as in substance enacting the equity
N
rule on the same subject, and ixing the period of limitation.
In an action by an assignee in bankruptcy of a fraudulent debtor, where
the fraud was continuou, and the debtor remained down to the time suit was
brought, the real owner of the property sought to be recovered and in possession of it: Held, that the statute did not bar the suit, even though the
initial fraudulent transaction took place more than five years before suit was
commenced.

Tmis was a bill in equity filed originally in the District Court
by Martin, as assignee in bankruptcy of one Edward K.
Woodward, to recover certain property from the defendants.
Prior to February, 1861, Woodward had been a merchant in
St. Louis, doing business in his own name and in the usual
way. In the fall of 1860, however, he became much embarrassed, and, in fact, insolvent. He endeavored late in 1860,
first through the defendant, Gray, and subsequently through
the defendant, Smith, to effect a compromise with his eastern
creditors, but could not succeed. The defendant, Smith, is a
brother-in-law of Woodward, is by profession an attorney-atlaw, and resides in Hartford, Connecticut.
On the 8th December, 1861, Woodward, at St. Louis, wrote
to Smith, at Hartford, informing him that suits were already
begun against him, entreating him to go to New York and
Philadelphia to see if he could not effect the desired compromise andextension. Woodward's letter then continues: "Make
'the best arrangement possible, except cash down or security;
and if you cannot arrange -with them, come right on here and
buy me out on terms that you will be safe in, and such as they
will be forced to accept our terms. One suit is within the justice's jurisdiction, and judgment will be rendered on the 10th,
so I want something done previous to that time. The trial
of the other two is set for the 17th. I shall call for a witness
who, I don't believe, will be got at the time, and the proba-
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bility is that they will be continued for the present. My real
estate is in a precarious condition, and unless you can get
those creditors into the arrangement, so as to give me time to
protect it, everything will be swallowed up, unless you can
come out, etc. * * I shall be anxious to hear from you."
Sdaith failed to make any compromise, but he effected a purchase of certain claims against Woodward at twenty-five cents
on the dollar; went to St. Louis February, 1861, and on the
5th of that month purchased of Woodward his stock of merchandise, for the expressed consideration of $11,360.
This sum was paid by turning over to Woodward. at their
face value, the claims which Smith had purchased a few days
before at one-fourth of that sum; by assuming amounts due
for the rent of the store building, and by his three notes to
Woodward. for $919.64 each.
These notes were soon afterward paid to Woodward inclaims
which Smith purchased of Woodward's creditors at twentyfive cents, on the dollar, and then sent to St. Louis and turned
over to Woodward at their par or nominal value, and the notes
-for rent were paid out of proceeds of goods sold from the store.
After the sale of the goods to Smith, the store was operated
in the name of Bailey, agent, for over a year; then in the name
of Bell, agent, until March, 1846, when a limited partnership
was formed under the statute of Missouri, the articles being
executed by the defendants, Gray and Smith-the former being the general and the latter the special partner. This limited partnership was by its terms to continue for three years
from March 1, 1864, and the business was to be conducted in
the name of Gray. When the three years expired the same
arrangement was continued, and the store was being thus
conducted in December, 1867, when Woodward was, on his
-own petition, adjudicated a bankrupt, and in July, 1868, when
the present suit was commenced.
On the 22d April,1868,Woodward,without beforehand consulting Smith, made to him, subject to certain incumbrances, a
deed of all his real estate, and this deed was placed on record
in February, 1862. Among other parcels was the house in
which Woodward then lived, and where he has ever since re
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sidd without paying rent therefor, and the taxes on which
have been paid by Woodward out of money from the store.
Certain parcels were redeemed by Woodward's direction from
judicial sales, by money likewise taken from the store, and
titles made in the name of Smith, of which he was subsequently
advised. From the store also, and under Woodward's management, eDcumbrances have been paid off and the items have
been assigned to Smith, who holds them against the property.
[See Robb v. IVoodward, Sup. Ct. Mo., March term, 1870.]
Soon after the purchase of the goods, Smith returned to Con.
necticut, leaving the store in the nominal possession of one
Bailey as his agent, and taking with him of the moneys in the
store the sum of $37 to pay his expenses. In the professed
capacity of clerk for Smith, Woodward remained in the store
from the time of his sale .to Smith, in February, 1861, down
to the time of the filing of the present bill, and the evidence
showed that, in fact, he managed there as before, and that
Bailey and Bell, and even Gray, acted under his direction.
The bill made Smith, Woodward and Gray defendants, and
set out at great length all of the above-mentioned facts, with
many others, and charged a fraudulent combination throughout all these transactions between Smith and Woodward to
defraud the creditors of the latter; that the sale of the goods
was colorable and fraudulent; that in reality Woodward was
the real owner during all'th time the business was conducted
in the name of "Bailey, agent," and in the name of "Bell,
agent," and in the name of Gray; that the real partner of
Gray is Woodward, and not Smith; that Smith has been re.
funded out of the sales from the store all moneys which he
has expended in the purchase of claims against Woodward,
or for advances to purchase goods.
The bill also alleged that Woodward, in pursuance of the
original fraudulent design, procured to be effected the limited
partnership with Gray, who was to contribute $6,000 in cash
against the stock, which was put at $12,000, and Gray was to
be interested in one.third of the profits and Woodwardin twothirds, but to carry out the fraud, Smith's name was used in
the articles, and not Woodward's. The bill stated that large
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profits had been made; that the stock increased in value,"that
Woodward, at the date of his bankruptcy, was entitled To -a
large sum from the firm; that Gray had withdrawn large sums
and amounts, and was indebted to his co-partner, Woodward,
therefor; that the defendants Smith &Gray had a large amount
of property belonging to the firm, which they had sold since
the bankruptcy of Woodward was declared.
The bill also stated that the assignee, after his appointment
in January, 1868, first discovered the frauds aforesaid; that
claims to the amount of about $13,000 had been established
against the estate of Woodward, by various creditors named,
none of whom, it was averred, knew of the frauds complained
of until January 3, 1867.
It was also averred that Smith & Gray denied that Woodward had any interest in the firm, and it was stated that the
latter had falsely returned to the Bankrupt Court that he had
no interest therein.
The prayer of the bill was that an account be taken of all
the said partnership dealings between the defendants; that
what should be found due from Smith & Gray to the firm be
decreed to be paid to the complainant as assignee; that the
respective rights of the defendants in the firm property, at the
date of Woodward's bankruptcy, be determined; that a receiver be appointed to collect the debts and take charge of
the property of the partnership; that the property be sold
and converted into money, and for general relief.
The defendants severally answered, denying the frauds
charged against them, and also denying that Woodward ever
had any interest in the limited partnership mentioned. Smith,
in his answer, specially pleaded the statute of limitations of the
State of Missouri, alleging that the purchase of the goods,
chargedin the bill to be fraudulent, was made February 5,1861,
and that no suit to set aside said sale as fraudulent as to creditors was brought by or for them within five years after the
sale was made and possession taken, wherefore the creditors
ard the assignee are barred of such suit by the statute of
November 22, 1855, referred to in the opinion of the court.
Replications were filed; a large amount of testimony was
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taken, and on final hearing the bill was dismissed, whereupon
the assignee appealed to this court.
Lee & Webster, and Cline, Jameson& Day,for the assignee.
Whittlsey & Hamilton for the defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
D LoN, 0. J.-In the argument at the bar counsel differed,
not indeed respecting the general 'nature of the bill, but upon
the point whether in the relief sought it embraced the real
estate conveyed by the bankrupt to the respondent, Smith,
as well as the personal property or the interest in the copartnership firm therein mentioned.
The point is important, for the limitation as to real actions
is ten years, and as to personal actions five years. The present
bill was exhibited more than five, but within ten years after
the sale of the goods and the conveyance of the real property.
If the averments of the bill and the prayer for relief be carefully examined, it is plain, beyond controversy, that all that is
alleged respecting the real estate is in the nature of inducement, to show the character of the dealings between Woodward
and Smith, and to make probable the gravamen of complaint.
It is extremely important that we shall obtain a correct
notion of the real nature, scope and purpose of the bill; for
upon the view we take of this will depend, as we shall presently see, the question whether the statute of limitation bars
the relief sought.
The bill is not one to set aside as fraudulent the sale of the
specific stock of goods made in February, 1861, or to recover
their value as property to which the creditors of the bankrupt are entitled. This sale is indeed set out in the bill, and
is alleged therein to have been fraudulent, but it is set forth
only as inducement, as the initial transaction of a fraudulent
conspiracy and scheme, which ended, not with the consummation of that particular sale, but which continued in existence and was flagrant down to ihe period when Woodward was
adjudicated a bankrupt, and when the suit was commenced.
The plea of the statute sets out this sale made in February,
1861, and then alleges that the suit is barred by reason of the
]apse of more than five years before it was commenced. The
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plea misconceives the nature and purpose of the bill, and pro.
ceeds upon the mistaken notion that it is brought simply to
inipeach the original sale of the stock of goods made more
than seven years before.
The true view of the bill is, that it charges that the real
parties in interest in the business of the limited partnership
carried on in the name of the defendant Gray, are Woodward
and Gray, and not Smith and Gray, as appears on the face of
the written and recorded articles, and as given out by all three
of them to creditors and the world, and consequently that the
interest of Woodward in this business and in the assets of
the firm belongs to the assignee for the benefit of his creditors, and it is this interest which the assignee by the present
suit is seeking to recover.
The suit is a personal, as distinguished from a real, action,
and hence the ordinary limitation period is five years, and
not ten, from the time when the cause of action accrued:
Bobb v. Woodward, Supt. Ct. Mo. March T. 1870.
In the case just cited the Supreme Court of Missouri decided upon the proof before it, that the conveyance of the real
estate by Woodward to Smith was fraudulent, and of the correctness of that judgment on this point there can be no question.
That case had no relation to the personal property or partnership interest now in controversy, and there was no question as
to when the fraud was discovered, and hence what is said in
the opinion on these subjects by way of argument by the
learned judge who delivered it, is not to be taken as points
decided by the court.
Upon the proofs in the record now before us we consider
the fraudulent conspiracy between Woodward and Smith,
charged in the bill, to be so clear as not to admit of fair debate, and that so far from ending with the purchase of the
goods in 1861, it continued down to the time this bill was
brought. The evidence is voluminous, and it would require
too much time without any resulting benefits, to enter upon
a detailed or analytical statement and discussion of it.
Suffice it to say, that it firmly establishes that Woodward designed to place the property beyond the reach of his efeditors,
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that Smith made a colorable purchase of the goods to enable
the debtor to affect' his purpose; that apparently he has received from the sale of the goods in the store all sums which
he expended in buying claims against Smith or otherwise;
that Woodward was all the time the real, while Smith was
only the nominal, party in interest. That the purchase ofthe
stock of goods by Smith was fraudulent is very faintly, if at
all, denied by counsel. At all events they have placed the
stress of their defense upon the statute of limitation, and it was
upon this ground, undoubtedly, that the bill was dismissed by
the learned judge whose decree we are called upon to review.
The question involved is alike interesting and important. To
determine it, we must first look at the statute and ascertain its
meaning and purpose, and then at the special character of the
case in hand, and see whether it is one where the statute will
operate to bar the relief sought. In a suit of this kind the
assignee is clothed with all the rights of creditors (whom indeed he represents) to impeach transfers of property made by
their debtor or colorably held by others in fraud of their rights.
The code of Missouri declares that "there shall be but one
action in the State for the enforcement or protection of private
rights, and the r~dress or prevention of private wrongs, which
shall be denominated a civil action": 2Wagner's Stat., 991, §1.
The statute of limitations (section 8) enacts that "civil
actions other than those for the recovery of real property can
only be commenced within the periods prescribed in the following sections, after the causes of action shall have accrued."
"Sect. 10, within 5 years; fifth, an action for relief on ground
of fraud-the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party at any
time within 10 years of the facts constituting thefraud": Id. 918.
Unless Congress has otherwise provided, State statutes of
limitation are applied to controversies in the courts of the
United States with the same effect as they would be if the
controversy were pending in the courts of the State.
It is necessary, therefore, to construe the tenth section of
the statute of limitations above quoted, in order to determine
its effect upon the rights of the parties to the present suit.
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-Wehave had called to our attention no decision of the high.
est court of the State construing this statute in respect to the
precise questions which we are now to decide. The legitimate
office of construction is to ascertain the legislative will or purpose; and to this end it is not only proper, but often necessary.
to look not simply at the language of the particular enactment
under consideration. but also at the subject matter of it, in the
light which the former law or general principles shed upon it.
Formerly, in the State of Missouri, the forms of action and
modes of procedure were as at common law, with a distinct
equity jurisdiction. At that time the statutes of limitations
were, in substance, the same as 21 Jac. 1. c. 16, and professed
to apply only to certain specified actions at law: Rev. Stat.,
1845, p. 373, 374.
Equity at this time applied, of course, these statutes according to the settled doctrines of that court.
The code subsequently enacted provided, as we have seen.
that there should be but "one form of action ,,-" a civil ac-

tion; " and the legislature made the statute of limitations apply to all civil actions ; which statute would probably be held
in this State, as it has been in others under legislation of a
similar character, to embrace equitable as well as legal causes
of action so far as they fall within the terms of the act. That
is, the limitations as to all actions therein mentioned and provided for, applies equally to causes of action formerly cognizable either in equity or at law: Newman v. De Lorimer,19 Iowa
244; Johnson v. Hopins, Id. 49 ; MeNair v. Lott, 25 Mo. 182.

In this view it is easy to perceive'why the legislature
adopted the 10th section of the act concerning the limitation
in cases offraud. If the provision had beenmerely that "actions
for relief on the ground of fraud should be commenced within
five years after the cause of action accrued," it is extremely probable that the courts would have been obliged to have hell
that the statute would begin to run from the period when the
fraud was consummated, and not as under the well-know a
equity rule, from the period whenthe fraud was or should have
been discovered. To remove all doubt on the point, and ta
oreserve the equity doctrine on the subject, the legislature
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added the words: "The cause of action in such case shall not
be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved
parts * * * of the facts constituting the fraud."

In my judgment, the legislature by this provision, in sub.
stance re-enacted the doctrine which had been established by
courts of equity, as to the effect of fraud in preventing the
running or operation of statutes of limitation.
If this be so, it becomes important to examine the nature
and grounds of the equity doctrine, the better to understand
the meaning of the statute.
Mr. Justice SToIy states the doctrine of equity thus: "If a
party has perpetrated a fraud which has not been discovered
until the statutable bar may apply to it at law, courts of equity
will interfere to remove the bar out of the way of the injured
party." (Eq. Jurisp. section 1521). "The question often arises
in cases of fraud or mistake, * * under what circumstances
and at what time the bar of the statute begins to run." * *
"In cases of fraud and mistake, it will begin to run," he says,
"from the time of the discovery of such fraud or mistake, and
not before:" Id., section 1521 a.
This distinguished jurist, on the circuit, in the Supreme
Court, andin the preparation of his commentaries, had frequent
occasion thoroughly to explore this subject, and his opinions
upon it are entitled to great consideration, though it is to be
regretted that he does not go more into detail. In his commentaries, he does not discuss the nature of the fraud which in
equity will prevent the bar of the statute from running; nor
what, in view of that court, will amount to a discovery of
the fraud. An examination of these topics, as well as of the
ground and reason of the rule itself, is essential to a thorough
understanding of the subject, and is required by the circumstances of the cause now before us for determination.
As to the kind of fraud contemplated: Some judges have

said that the fraud which will avoid the effect of the statute
of limitations must be positive and actual fraud. But this is
a point which we are not now required to notice, for in this
-ase the fraud was actual and positive.
It seems to me quite clear, both from an examination of the
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authorities and the nature of the case, that the fraud which
shall operate t3 displace the statute or prevent its application
is secret or concealed fraud, a fraud unknown to be such to the
party injured thereby. In a leading case on the subject Lord
REDESDAiL. said: "That as fraud is a secret thing, and may
remain undiscovered for a length of time, during such time the
statute of limitations shall not operate; because, until discovery
the title to avoid it does not completely arise, etc. Pending the
concealment of the fraud, the statute ought not in conscience
to run," etc.: Hovendon v. Lord Annesly, 2 Sch. & Lef. 624.
That the fraud must be secret or concealed, not openly
known and visible, to prevent the bar of the statute from running is distinctly asserted or assumed in many cases: Troup
v. Smith, 20 John. R. 33, 47, 48, per SPENCER, 0. J.; Stearns
v. Paige,7 How. 819, 829 ; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt., C. C. IL
230; S. C., Id. 399; McLain v. Ferrell,1 Swan, Tenn. 48
Bucknor v. Calcote, 28 Mississ. 432; Wilson v. Joy, 32 Id.
233 Cook v. Lindsey, 34 Id. 451; Young v. Cook, 30 Id. 320
Campbell v. Vining, 25 Ill. 525; Farnum v. Brooks, 9 Peck
212; Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 421; ioorev. Greene, 2 Curt.

C. 0. R. 202; affirmed 19 How. 69, 72; Angell on Limit. ch.
XVIH.;'Sugden onVend. 612 pl. 17.
It is declared, indeed, that no case can be found where the
statute has been avoided, at law or in equity, unless on the
ground of fraudulent concealment on the defendant's part:
Bishop v. Little, 3 Grecul. Me. 405.

This subject was discussed by a truly great judge in the
case of Carr v. Hilton, above mentioned, which was a suit in
equity, by an assignee in bankruptcy, to recover of the defendant lands fraudulently conveyed to him by the bankrupt. The
defendant relied on the statute of limitations found in the bankrupt act of 1841. In holding that the cause of action did not
acerue-to the assignee till the fraud was discovered, CuRTIs, J.,

says: "Statutes of limitation do not run in cases of fraud
-while it is secret. It is objected that the bill does not contain any averment that the case of action was fraudulently
concealed. But it does state a case of secret fraud, and it
wold ;be difficult to distinguish this from fraudulent conceal-
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.ient. A secret, or what is the same thing, concealed fraud,
is a fraudulent concealment of the cause of. action." This I
assent to as a perspicuous and accurate statement of the law
on this point.
As to what amounts to a discovery within the meaning of the

equity rule: This is regarded as so important thatit must, With
all necessary'circumstances, be distinctly stated in the bill.
GRIER, J., speaking of this point when delivering the opinipn
of the Supreme Court, says: "Especially must there be a distinct allegation as to the time when the fraud was discovered,
and what the discovery is, so that the court may see whether,
by the exercise of ordinary diligence, it might not have been
before made:" Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt. C. C. R. 390; Fisherv.
Boody, Id. 206; Moore v. Green, 2 Id. 202, 206; S. 0. 19 How.
69. And the bill, it has even been said, should negative
laches in not making the discovery: Mayne v. Griswold, 3
Sauf. 463; Field v. Wilson, 6 B. Mon. 479.
The question recurs, however, WVhat is discovery? I answer,
notice of the fraud; or, in the language of the Missouri statute,
of "the facts constituting the fraud." What is notice? In
answering this, Judge CuRus, in Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curtis, C.
C. R. 390, 393, quotes and approves the following doctrine laid
down in Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne & Keen 719, 721, 722:
"It is a well established principle that whatever is notice enough
to excite attention and put the party upon his guard, and call
for inquiry, is notice of everything to which such inquiry
might have led. When a person has sufficient information
to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it."
The cases quite generally hold that the statute will run and

fraud will not avoid it, if the plaintiff, under all the circumstances, has been guilty of negligence in discovering or attackingit: Smith v.Talbot, 18 Texas 774; McDonald v. McGuire,
8 Id. 361, 370; Campbellv. Vining, 25 Ill. 525; Ferrisv. Hendorson, 12 Penn. St. 49; Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ala. (N. S.),
90; Bucknor v. Calcote, 28 Miss. 432; Edmondk v. Goodwin,
28 Geo. 38; Lott v. De Graffenreid, 10 Rich (Eq.) 348; Far.
mum v. Brooks, 9 Peck 212; Way v. Cutting, 20 N. H. 187;
Steans v. Paige,7How. 819, 829; Edwards v. Gibbs, 31 Miss."
45
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Angell on Lim., sec. 183, and note, see. 190 ; Nudd v. B'amo.
Un, 8 Allen (Mass.), 130, and cases cited.
It is easy, it seems to me, to press this principle too far, and
I prefer the test or doctrine approved and applied by Judge
CuT~m, i. e. holding the plaintiff to know all that the information he is possessed 'of niakes it his duty, as a reasonable man,
ordinarily vigilant in protectinig his own interesis, to know or
to learn.
The language of the statute is "discovery by the aggrieved
party at any tiine within ten years, of the facts constituting
the fraud." This is the same, ih my opinion; as if it read di.covery of the fraud. If a party knows the facts constituting
the fraud, he knows the transaction to be fraudulent. It is not
enough simply that he is aware of the fact of the transfer, but
he must know "the facts" which make that transfer fraudulent.
In Godbalt v. Lambert, 8 Rich. Eq. 155, 164, where an
alleged fraudulent deed was placed on record, and it was contended that creditors were bound to know its character, the
chancellor very sensibly observed, "registry of a deed is only
implied notice of its contents, and not of any fraud that may
be perpetrated in its execution." I cannot assent to the cor
rectuess of the remark in the case. of Lott v. De Graffenreid,
10 Td., 346, that the registry of a deed is sufficient notice to
creditors, and the statute of limitations begins to run from
that period, even though the deed be fraudulent.
There is one peculiarity of the Missouri statute which ought
not to be passed without notice, and that is the clause which
renders it necessary to make the discovery of the fraud within
ten years. The language of the section was evidently copiud
from the New York code, which is literally the same as the
Missouri statute, except that in New York the words "at any
time within ten years" are omitted: Howard's N. Y. code, sec.
91. The same words are omitted likewise from the Ohio code,
the Nebraska code (St., 1857, p. 295), the Kansas code (St.,
1868, p. 633), the Minnesota code (St., 1866, p. 451), and the
Iowa code (Re., 1860, sec. 2741). All these statutes enact
that in actions for relief on the ground of fraud, "the cause of
action shall not be deemed to accrue until the discovery of the
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f&aud," or of the "facts constituting the fraud." Words limiting the time when the discovery shall be made are, so far as
I have observed, peculiar to the legislation of Missouri.
Lord ERsK=Nx, in one case, declared that "No length of time
can prevent the unkenneling of a fraud:" Forrester 66. Lord
NoRTHINGTON said, with emphasis, in Alden v. Gregory, 2
Eden 285, "Never, while I sit here, will delay purge a fraud."
These expressions of decisive indignation against fraud are
natural enough indeed, but if taken literally they lay down a
doctrine which, if fully carried out, would be at war with the
peace and repose of society, on which rests the wise policy of
all limitation statutes. Hence the provision very generally
adopted in the legislation of the States that the statute will
begin to run from the period when the fraud is discovered,
and hence, also, the additional provision of the Missouri stat.
ute, which seems to require the discovery to be made within
ten years from the consummation of the fraud.
The effect of this provision is, not to declare that the plaintaif
cannot for a period of ten years be guilty of laches, or that he
may for fall ten years shut his eyes to facts which it would
otherwise be his duty to notice and act upon, but its effect,
rather, is to require him, at his peril, to make the discovery
within the prescribed period. I do not doubt that the provision is wise in conception, and will prove salutary in operation.
The reason or ground of this rule in equity is quite plain.
Applying, as this rule does, only to cases of secret or concealed,
as distinguished from known fraud, as before explained, I have
no doubt that Lord REDESDALE gives the true reason for its
adoption by equityviz.: that it is against conscience for a party
to avail himself of the statute when by his own fraud he has
prevented the other party from knowing or asserting his rights
within the period prescribed by the statutes of limitation: 2
Sch. and Lef. 634: Troup v. Smith, 20 John. 33, 47, 48.
This is entirely consistent with the exposition ofthe rationale
of the doctrine by Baron ALDERsoN in Brookshanc v. Smith,
2 Young & Coll. 68: " In cases of fraud courts of equity hold
that the statute runs from the discovery because the laches of
the plaintiff commences from that date, on his acquaintance
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with all the circumstances. In this courts of equity differ from
courts of law, which are absolutely bound by the words of
the statute:" Imp. Gas, &c., Co.,v. London Gas Light Co., 26

Eng. Law and Eq. 425.
So in cases under the Missouri statute: the limitation begins to run as against the plaintiff when he has knowledge of
facts Which would have impressed a reasonable man with the
belief that the transactions were fraudulent, for from that time
his laches begin, if his debt is mature.
Judge CumIS, in the case before cited, speaking of the
ground of the rule that fraud avoids the statute, says: "In
my judgment the most reasonable and sensible ground is that,
substantially, the title to avoid it does not arise until the
fraud is known: 1 Curt. 0. 0. R. 230. This is adopting the
view of Lord TALBOT, Gas. t. Talbot 63, and it has also the
sanction of other eminent judges.
The title to avoid the fraudulent transaction does ordinarily
arise as soon as the fraud is perpetrated (26 Eng. Law and
Eq. 425, J. J. Marsh 445; 33 Mississ. 233; 20 Johns 33
supra); but substantiallyit does not, because the fraud is not
known, and hence the fraudulent wrongdoer is stopped, while
the aggrieved party is kept ignorant of his rights, from setting up against him the bar of the statute.
But this assumes that the creditor's debt is one that is due,
so that he is in law enabled effectively to assert his rights,
and therefore properly chargeable with negligence if he fails
for the prescribed period to do so.
There may be some question as to the scope of the language of the statute, "an action of relief on the ground of
fraud;" but there is no doubt that a bill in equity by a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance to transfer of property
by his debtor, in such an action. The cases before cited will
show that this point has never been disputed.
Having thus seen that the present suit is one which falls
within the aforementioned tenth section of the limitation act;
that the fraud comtemplated by that Act is fraud which is
secret or concealed, as distinguished from that which is open
and known; and having also seen what, in view of a court
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of equity, is regarded as a discovery of the fraud, so that
thenceforth the laches of the plaintiff and the running of the
statute alike begin; that the ten years' limitation in the section is not to be construed as sanctioning negligence or the
shutting of eyes to information of the fraud; and having also
seen the reason, or policy and purpose of this legislation, we
are now prepared to apply the statute, as thus expounded, to
the facts of the present cause. This, in view of the length of
this opinion already, we must do briefly.
The facts constituting fraud in the transfer of property by
a debtor, are, in some cases, concealed or secret, and in some
visible or open. The fraud in the sale of the stock of goods
to Smith, in February, 1861, in view of the relationship of
the parties, of facts known to a great many creditors as to
Woodward's condition, and Smith's knowledge of it, and the
manner in which Woodward was still allowed to exercise
control over the property, was such, in bur judgment, that
any creditor might, if ordinarily vigilant, have discovered it
within five years from its sale.
If the present was a bill simply to have declared fraudulent
the sale made in 1861, we should have to hold, taking all the
circumstances together, that the fraud was not so concealed or
secret but the creditors, using due diligence, might and should
have discovered it, and if their debts were due, could and
should have assailed it within the five years. Undoubtedly, it
was this view of the case which was taken in the court below.
But, as we have before shown, such is not the case made by
the bill, and such is not the relief sought. The question before
the court is, whether, upon the proofs, Woodward has any in.
terest in the limited partnership carried on in the name of the
respondent, Gray; whether Smith or Woodward is the party
really owning "1 interest other than that owned by Gray.
Upon this subject we entertain a very decided conviction,
and that is, that Smith has no real and substantial interest
therein; has apparently no money invested in it beyond what
he has received; that his pretense of ownership is purely
sham; a device to keep at bay the creditors of Woodward;
and that the latter, though held out simply to be a clerk, is the
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owner of the interest in the firm, other than that held by
Gray. Since 1861; Woodward has, in effect, been managing
the store the same as before, giving to it his time, attention
and skill; to these, and the profits which are their produdt,
his creditors, and not Smith, are best entitled.
Equity looks at substance and not form. -It penetrates be.
yond externals to the substance of things; and it accounts as
nothing, and delights to brush away barricades of written articles and formal documents when satisfied that they have
been devised to conceal or protect fraud.
The fraud in the case before us, as we view it, ended not
with the purchase of the goods in 1861, but continued down
to the time this bill was filed. The case is different from what
it would be if the sale of the goods had been the only transaction, and Smith had taken exclusive possession of them and
held or sold them as his own more than five years before his
purchase was attacked by creditors.
It is our opinion that the fraud, commenced in 1861, has
been continued down to the time this suit was brought; that
in equity, as respects creditors, the interest in the firm and its
business is owned by Woodward and not by Smith; that the
latter holds that interest, whatever it may be, in secret trust
for the former, and hence the statute of limitations cannot
avail to prevent that interest from being ascertained and subjected to the claims of creditors of the bankrupt.
It is not necessary in this view to consider the point 'made
that at all events the statute could not bar the relief sought,
at least not entirely, because the debts of some of the creditors of Woodward did not fall due util 1867.
We now decide two points only: First, That Woodward
has an interest in the property and assets of the firm business
carried on in the name of Gray, which may be reached by
the assignee in the present suit. Second, That the statute of limitation, pleaded by the respondent, Smith, is no
bar to the rel,;Fi sought.
The decree of the District Court is reversed.
J., concurred.
KREKRE

